Can Congress Buy RLUIPA\u27s Way to Constitutional Salvation by Cramer, Benjamin D.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 55 | Issue 4
2005
Can Congress Buy RLUIPA's Way to
Constitutional Salvation
Benjamin D. Cramer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Benjamin D. Cramer, Can Congress Buy RLUIPA's Way to Constitutional Salvation, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1073 (2005)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol55/iss4/15
COMMENTS
CAN CONGRESS BUY RLUIPA'S WAY
TO CONSTITUTIONAL SALVATION?
INTRODUCTION
What do prison administration and land use policy have in com-
mon? On the surface, these topics appear to have little to do with each
other, yet they are both subjects of a federal law designed to protect
religious freedom in areas where Congress believes religious dis-
crimination runs rampant.
Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 20001 ("RLUIPA"), barring any government from
imposing a "substantial burden" upon a prisoner 2 or propagating a
land use regulation that imposes a "substantial burden" upon religious
assembly.3 Congress enacted RLUIPA using its authority under the
Commerce Clause,4 Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 and
one additional justification: the spending power.6 Congress tied the
statute to its spending power out of fear that its first two foundations
would not be sufficient to sustain the statute's constitutionality. But is
the spending power really the answer to Congress's prayers, or just
another golden calf waiting to be struck down by an angry Court?7
I Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000), (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-
5).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I (2005).
342 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2005).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2005) (land use provision); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(2)
(2005) (prisoner provision).
, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2005) (relating to land use).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A) (2005) (applying land use provision to all who receive
federal funds); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b)(1) (2005) (applying prisoner provision to all who re-
ceive federal funds).
7 Cf Exodus 32:8-10.("They have turned aside quickly out of the way I commanded
them. They have made for themselves a golden calf and have worshipped it and sacrificed to it
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The spending power is the one major area of Congressional au-
thority that has not yet been restrained by the Rehnquist Court's "fed-
eralism revolution.",8 The Court has strongly limited the scope of the
Commerce Clause9 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement
Clause ° while simultaneously expanding the breadth of state sover-
eignty. 1 Congress currently uses the spending power as a plenary
grant of authority whose scope is just as boundless as the Commerce
Clause's used to be.12 The plain language of the Commerce Clause
limits it to regulation of commercial activities that are "among the
several states" or with Indian tribes or foreign nations, whereas the
Spending Clause contains no such limitation. The sole textual limita-
tion on the spending power restricts Congress to spending for the
"general welfare," a description that the Court admits is nonjusticia-
ble.13
and said, 'these are your gods o Israel who brought you up out of Egypt!' . Now therefore let
me alone now, that my wrath may bum hot against them .. ") (ESV).
8 See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting offthe Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to Do So, 78
IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003) [hereinafter Baker & Berman] (describing the spending power as the
"notable exception" to the Rehnquist Court's reigning in of Congressional authority); John C.
Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 63
(2003) (claiming that over the last decade the Court has restored the founders' "vision of a
national government that was strong within the sphere of power assigned to it but limited by the
extent of that sphere.").
9 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act as beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause).
10 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (stating that Congress cannot use
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to expand constitutional liberties beyond the
boundaries recognized by the courts).
I See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot force a state to
be sued without its consent in its own court); College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that a state did not waive its sovereign immunity
merely be participating in interstate commerce); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(striking portions of the Brady Act for commandeering state executive officers); Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress could not abmgate state sovereign
immunity using its Article I powers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking
the "take title" provision of the statute as unconstitutionally burdening the states).
12 Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regu-
lation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 447 (2005) ("Under existing precedent, it nonetheless appears
Congress has ample authority to circumvent the Court's federalism holdings through the use of
conditional spending."); Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4
CHAP. L. REV. 195, 195-96 (2001) ("No matter how narrowly the Court might read Congress's
powers under the Commerce Clause ... the states will be at the mercy of Congress so long as
there are no meaningful limits on its spending power.").
13 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) ("The discretion belongs to Congress,
unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.").
See also Eastman, supra note 8, at 66 ("the contemporary view is that Congress's power to
provide for the 'general welfare' is a power to spend for virtually anything that Congress itself
views as helpful.").
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Professor Erwin Chemerinsky observed that "[t]he next frontier of
litigation is sure to be the Spending Clause."' 4 RLUIPA could be one
arena in which this battle is fought. The Supreme Court recently re-
solved its first RLUIPA case. In Cutter v. Wilkinson15 the Court held
that RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment Clause. But, despite
being invited to do so, the Court did not rule on the validity of
RLUIPA under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. ' 6
Focusing exclusively upon the prisoner provisions, this Comment
explores the exercise of the spending power in RLUIPA and assumes,
arguendo, that RLUIPA is beyond the grasp of the Commerce Clause,
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that it does not vio-
late the state sovereignty. In other words, if the constitutionality of
RLUIPA's prisoner provisions depended solely upon the spending
power, would it withstand constitutional scrutiny? This Comment
ultimately concludes that it would not because the spending condi-
tions in RLUIPA are not sufficiently related to the appropriations to
which they are attached, creating a coercive Hobson's choice for the
states. Part I describes RLUPIA's history and background. Part II
explores the application of the current Spending Clause jurisprudence
to RLUIPA, and Part III offers a normative suggestion for courts to
follow in future spending cases.
PART I: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. The Road to RLUIPA
RLUIPA was not a spontaneous proposal. Congress enacted
RLUIPA in response to specific governmental activities it viewed as
particularly threatening to religious liberty, and which Congress be-
lieved it had the power to regulate.
1. RLUIPA 's Inspiration
Several Supreme Court decisions in the late 1980s led Congress to
believe that prisoners' religious exercise rights were particularly vul-
nerable, and these concerns deepened in 1990 when the Court reinter-
preted its Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
14 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 77 (2001) ("there
has been a revolution with regard to the structure of the American government because of the
Supreme Court decisions in the last few years regarding federalism."). See also Adler, supra
note 13, at 434 (predicting that the question of the spending power's limits is "[Ilooming on the
horizqo"' 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005)
16 Brief in Response to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.
Ct. 308 (2004) (No. 03-9877).
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a. Prison Cases
The Supreme Court's October 1986 Term produced two decisions
that inspired RLUIPA's specific inclusion of state prison regula-
tions.17 In Turner v. Safley, 18 the Court reviewed a class action chal-
lenge to two Missouri prison regulations. One of the regulations re-
quired an inmate to obtain the warden's permission before marrying
and limited the warden to granting such permission only "when there
[were] compelling reasons to do so."19 The other regulation prohibited
inmates from corresponding with one another unless they were writ-
ing to "immediate family members who [were] inmates in other cor-
rectional institutions," or "concerning legal matters. 2°
The trial court applied a strict scrutiny standard in striking the
regulations because they infringed upon inmates' fundamental right to
marry2' and were an overly broad violation of the inmates' First
Amendment rights.22 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.23
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision to strike the marriage regu-
lation, but reversed the decision regarding the correspondence regula-
tion.24 The Court rejected the application of strict scrutiny and held
that "a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the
constitutionality of [] prison rules. 25 According to the Court, a prison
regulation will withstand constitutional scrutiny if it is "reasonably
,,26
related to legitimate penological objectives. The correspondence
regulation met this standard, the marriage regulation did not.27
The Court applied this rule in another prisoner case decided just a
week later. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,28 two Muslim inmates
challenged a New Jersey regulation preventing them from returning
inside during Friday afternoons to celebrate the weekly Muslim con-
gregational service of Jumu'ah. 29 The Court reiterated its standard
from Turner and rejected the inmates' argument that the Free Exer-
cise Clause required the state to accommodate their religious practices
17 See Baker & Berman, supra note 8, at 496 (2003).
Is 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
19 Id. at 82 (noting that permission was generally given only in the event of pregnancy or
the birth of an illegitimate child).
20 Id. at 81.
21 Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 594 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
22 Id. at 595.
23 Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th Cir. 1985).
24 Turner, 482 U.S. at 99-100.
Id. at 81.
26 Id. at 79.
27 Id. at 99-100.
28 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
29 Id. at 342.
[Vol. 55:41076
2005] CAN CONGRESS BUY RLUIPA 'S WAY TO CONST. SALVATION 1077
unless it was too dangerous to do so. 30 The Court ruled that the proper
standard to apply to prisoners' claims of free exercise was one of rea-
sonableness, and the regulation at issue was reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest.31 According to one observer, "the
plight of the Orthodox Jewish prisoner worsened dramatically after
Turner' 32 because "[t]he new 'rational relation to legitimate pe-
nological interests' test effectively validated any prison regulation. 33
b. Neutrality and General Applicability
Turner and O'Lone applied only to challenges by inmates; but the
Court later restricted any individual's ability to successfully challenge
a government action limiting religious exercise.
The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause protects an individ-
ual's right to engage in religious activity.34 Prior to 1990 this meant
that any state action which imposed a substantial burden upon the free
exercise of religion was subject to strict scrutiny review,35 or a similar
requirement that government demonstrate an "overriding governmen-
tal interest" before infringing upon religious exercise. 36 However, in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,37 the Court abandoned the substantial burden test and adopted
a narrower interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Smith involved a challenge by several Oregon employees who
were fired for using peyote, and were denied state unemployment
benefits.38 The employees, members of the Native American Church,
accused the state of unconstitutionally discriminating against them by
withholding benefits because of their participation in an activity re-
30 Id. at 349.
31 Id. at 350.
32 Eric J. Zogry, Comment, Orthodox Jewish Prisoners and the Turner Effect, 56 LA. L.
REV. 905, 927 (1996).
33 Id. The rational basis test is a very permissive standard, it "simply asks whether 'the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.' If the question can be answered in the
affirmative, which it almost always can, then courts refuse to interfere. It is only in the rare
circumstance when the government cannot justify its action as rationally related whatsoever that
the court will nullify the statute." Benjamin D. Cramer, Note, Eminent Domain for Private
Development-An Irrational Basis for the Erosion of Property Rights, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
409, 420 (2005) (citation omitted).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. I (Free Exercise Clause); see, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712
(2004); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
35 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
36 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
37 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
38 Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. Peyote, inter alia, was banned by OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)
(1987) (defining a controlled substance as any drug classified in Schedules I through V of the
Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-12).
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quired by their religion.39 The Supreme Court ruled against the em-
ployees, abandoning its "substantial burden" test in favor of a test of
neutral and general applicability. 40 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia noted that the mere possession of religious beliefs does not
relieve an individual from obeying a general law not aimed at the
restriction of those religious beliefs.4' Justice Scalia referred to Rey-
nolds v. United States,42 an 1879 case in which the Court upheld a
polygamy conviction despite a claim that polygamy was within the
defendant's religious beliefs because "[1]aws are made for the gov-
ernment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere reli-
gious belief and opinions, they may with practices. ' 43 Justice Scalia
concluded that "generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have
the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be jus-
tified by a compelling governmental interest...."44
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
The Smith decision generated a great deal of controversy; but
while scholars were split on the issue,4 5 Congress was not. Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199346 ("RFRA") in
an attempt to overturn Smith and reestablish the substantial burden
test.47 Congress justified RFRA on the grounds that "in [Smith] the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the govern-
ment justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion. ' 48 RFRA was Congress's effort "to restore the com-
pelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner4 9 and Wisconsin
39 Id.
40 See id. at 879-80.
41 Id. at 885-86 (citing Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)).
Of course if a law was aimed at restricting religious beliefs then the law would still violate the
Free Exercise Clause, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 532 ("At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons.").
42 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
43 Id. at 166.
44 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
45 Compare William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991), with Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional
Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REV. 651 (1991), and Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
4 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-
4).
41 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW - SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 19.3 (1999).
48 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2005).
49 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
[Vol. 55:41078
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v. Yoder 5° and to guarantee its application in all cases where free ex-
ercise of religion is substantially burdened ....
Congress enacted RFRA under the Fourteenth Amendment's En-
forcement Clause52 because the Fourteenth Amendment allows Con-
gress to enforce the Bill of Rights's guarantees against the states.53 In
the opinion of Congress, the Court was not doing enough to protect
the First Amendment's guaranteed right to freely exercise religion.54
Congress believed the Smith decision emboldened municipal govern-
ments and led them to govern as they pleased without taking religious
exercise into account.
55
RFRA was first tested before the Supreme Court in City of Boerne
v. Flores.56 Saint Peter's Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas was plan-
ning to expand, but the city designated the area adjacent to the church
as a historic district.57 While the church itself was not designated a
historic site, the church's faqade was located within the historic dis-
trict.58 The church applied for a building permit to enlarge the part of
the church that was not located within the district, but the city denied
it, claiming that it considered the entire church to be historical, thus
there could be no expansion. 59 The church sued the city under RFRA,
claiming that the city was using the historical designation to impose a
substantial burden on its free exercise rights by preventing it from
expanding to accommodate the size of its congregation. 6° Interest-
ingly, the city did not deny the accusations, but instead argued that
RFRA was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's enforce-
ment power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6'
The Court agreed with the city, finding that Congress had the
power to enforce the amendment, not the power to redefine existing
- 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2005).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
53 See H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993) ("Pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause... the legislative branch has been given the
authority to provide statutory protection for a constitutional value when the Supreme Court has
been unwilling to assert its authority.").
m 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2005) ("in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme
Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious
exercise imposed by laws neutral towards religion ... " (citation omitted)).
55 See Kevin M. Powers, The Sword and the Shield: RLU1PA and the New Battle Ground
of Religious Freedom, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 150-51 (2004) (detailing examples of local
activity that inspired RFRA, and ultimately RLUIPA).
56 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
57 Flores v. City of Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
58 Id.
59 Id.
6 Id.
61 Id.
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rights or create new ones.62 In Smith the Court described the metes
and bounds of the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause;
RFRA's aim was to expand those boundaries, not enforce adherence
to them. "Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause." Further, "Con-
gress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. 63 Thus, under
the Boerne rationale, Congress "is limited to enacting laws that pre-
vent or remedy violations of rights already recognized by the Su-
preme Court."64
Since the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to states, RFRA
still survives Boerne insofar as it applies to the federal government.65
As one commentator noted, "Congress's power to control the activi-
ties of federal agencies does not rest on the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather, the power to control a federal agency or program rests on
whatever power(s) Congress used to create it in the first place, sup-
plemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. 66 With its commerce
and enforcement powers restricted, Congress sought another means to
protect religious freedom, and a new legislative effort soon emerged.
62 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 290-91 (2002).
63 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
64 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68 at 291.
65 See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that unconstitutional provisions of RFRA were severable and the
remainder of the act still applied to the federal government); Hartmann v. Stone, 156 F.3d 1229
(6th Cir. 1998) (noting that RFRA might still apply to the federal government); In re Young,
141 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that RFRA still applies to the government and effec-
tively amends the bankruptcy code to prevent substantial burdens with religious exercise.);
Michael McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, Ill HARV. L. REV. 153, 162 n.68 (1997) ("Boerne should not affect the application of
RFRA to federal actions.... The Court's ruling that RFRA cannot be justified as an exercise of
Congress's authority under Section Five would not seem to affect Congress's authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate federal instrumentalities.") (citations omitted); but see,
e.g., Patel v. United States, 132 F.3d 43 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding federal inmate's RFRA claim
void as being moot following Boerne); United States v. Tessier (In re Tessier), 127 F.3d 1106
(9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to vacate Bankruptcy Court's decision that RFRA was no longer
valid); Edward J.W. Blatnik, Note, No RFRAF Allowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act's Federal Application in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1410 (1998) (noting that the Court struck RFRA as exceeding the Enforcement Clause
which does not apply to the federal government).
66 The Need for Federal Protection of Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1998) (testimony of Thomas C. Berg, Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School,
Samford University), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju50378.000/hju5O378O.htm (last visited
May 11, 2005).
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B. Congress Tries Again: RLUIPA
1. Background
Congress attempted to correct RFRA's constitutional deficiencies
by enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 ("RLUIPA").67 RLUIPA had the same goal as RFRA, but did
so only in the context of prisons 68 (in response to Turner and O'Lone)
and land use6 9 (in response to the factual scenario of Boerne). Con-
gress justified RLUIPA using several of its enumerated powers, pre-
sumably so that if the statute failed under one of the powers it could
still survive under another. Congress sought to bring RLUIPA within
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment by codifying the Smith
holding that strict scrutiny applies when a governmental action in-
volves individualized assessments.7° Congress also justified RLUIPA
under the Commerce7 1 and Spending Clauses.72
2. Challenges to RLUIPA
Challenges to RLUIPA have taken two different forms: some
claimed that RLUIPA violated an independent constitutional provi-
sion, while others claimed that RLUIPA exceeded Congress's enu-
merated powers.
a. Claims that Congress violated a Constitutional provision
Several RLUIPA challenges claimed the statute violated a consti-
tutional bar. Some of these cases asserted that Congress infringed
upon the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment
by attempting to regulate state correctional and local land use poli-
cies,73 while others claimed that RLUIPA violated common law and
67 Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc - 2000cc-
5).
(8 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I (2005).
69 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2005).
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2005) (dealing with land use regulations)
71 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2005) (land use); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(2) (2005)
(prisoner provision).
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A) (2005) (land use); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b)(1) (2005)
(prisoner provision).
73 See, e.g., Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
RLUIPA did not usurp a core state function in violation of the Tenth Amendment); see also
Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 324 (2003) ("the focus of the
members of Congress in enacting RLUIPA was on becoming the sole savior of religious liberty,
and decidedly not on its disruptive impact on traditional arenas of state control, land use, and
prison administration.").
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Eleventh Amendment protections of state sovereign immunity. 4 Still
others claimed RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause. 5
b. Claims that Congress lacked the power to enact RLUIPA
Another common RLUIPA challenge urged the courts to rule that
the statute exceeded Congress's enumerated powers and is no more
consistent with Boerne than RFRA was. If RLUIPA merely codified
the Smith standard then it just expressed what the Court already
stated; but it appears that RLUIPA was enacted because Congress did
not believe that Smith provided enough protection to religious exer-
cise.76 Therefore, according to this argument, RLUIPA must be meant
to provide more protection than Smith, in which case Congress is
again attempting to expand the boundaries of the Free Exercise
Clause, running directly contrary to the Court's holding in Boerne.
Another common objection to RLUIPA has been that it exceeded
Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.77 Likewise, some
litigants challenged RLUIPA under the Spending Clause; but these
arguments have been given little attention and none have been suc-
cessful.7 8
74 See Mayweathers v. Terhune, 2001 WL 804140 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd sub nom. May-
weathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting state sovereign immunity claim
because federal courts have jurisdiction to grant prospective injunctive relief against state offi-
cials who violate federal law).
75 See Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 108 Fed. Appx. 250 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (rejecting
Native American inmate's claim that forcing him to cut his hair would violate RLUIPA because
RLUIPA was invalid under the Establishment Clause); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th
Cir. 2003), cert. granted 125 S. Ct. 308 (2004) (declaring RLUIPA's application to prisons an
unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause); Kilaab al Ghashiyah v. Dept. of Corr. of
State of Wis., 250 F.Supp.2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003), overruled by Charles v. Verhagen, 348
F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003); but see Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003) (reinstating
inmate's claim that denial of kosher food violated RLUIPA, reversing lower court determination
that RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir.
2003) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge);
76 Heather Guidry, Comment, If at First You Don't Succeed.... Can the Commerce and
Spending Clauses Support Congress's Latest Attempt at Religious Freedom Legislation?, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 419, 420-22 (2002).
77 See, e.g., Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1163
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that RLUIPA was beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authority);
Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n of Town of New Milford, 289 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Conn. 2003)
(ruling that RLUIPA was a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority); Freedom
Baptist Church of Delaware County v. Township of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge); Terhune, 2001 WL 804140 (rejecting Commerce
Clause challenge); see also Lara A. Berwanger, Note, White Knight?: Can the Commerce
Clause Save the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
2355 (2004) (concluding that RLUIPA was beyond the post-Lopez interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause); Evan M. Shapiro, Note, The Religious Land Use And Institutionalized Persons
Act: An Analysis Under The Commerce Clause, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1255, (2001).
78 See, e.g., Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299 (11 th Cir. 2004); Midrash Sephardi, Inc.
v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (1 1th Cir. 2004); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th
[Vol. 55:41082
2005] CAN CONGRESS BUY RLUIPA 'S WAY TO CONST. SALVATION 1083
H. RLUIPA AND THE DOLE TEST
A. The Breadth of the Spending Clause
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Du-
ties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States. -U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
The General Welfare Clause is the first clause contained within
Article I, § 8-the section of the Constitution enumerating Congres-
sional power. The clause is frequently referred to as the Spending
Clause, 79 because many believe that it implies a spending power that
Congress can use to effectuate federal programs and attach conditions
to federal grants.80
The framers sharply debated just how broad the spending power
actually was, and modern academics have debated about whether it is
a grant of power at all. 81 The framers' debate primarily fell along two
lines: the Madisonian enumerated powers approach, and the Hamilto-
nian approach. 82 James Madison believed the Spending Clause was
merely a statement that Congress could spend its treasury to accom-
plish those tasks delegated to it by Article I, § 8.83 He noted that the
phrase "general welfare" was directly imported from the Articles of
Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Guidry, supra
note 82, at 455 (defending RLUIPA using the spending power).
79 For the remainder this Comment I will refer to it as the Spending Clause to avoid con-
fusion with other aspects of the General Welfare Clause.
80 Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in
Original Understanding. 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003).
81 Compare Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 93
(2001), with Natelson, supra note 86, at 4 ("Examination of history... shows that the General
Welfare Clause is more than a mere 'non-grant' of spending power. It was intended to be a
sweeping denial of power ... ").
82 See generally Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the President's Paramour):
An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1
of the United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1999) (comparing and contrast-
ing the different views).
83 Natelson, supra note 86, at 9-10.
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Confederation, 84 and he argued that no one believed those words to
give the Confederation plenary spending power.
Madison's view conflicted with that of his colleague, and coauthor
of The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton believed the
General Welfare Clause to be a plenary grant of authority to legislate
for any purpose that Congress deemed to be within the "general wel-
fare. 86 This version of Hamilton's idea has been referred to as the
"strong-Hamilton" position, to distinguish it from the "soft-Hamilton
position" proffered by Justice Story.87 Story's view suggests that the
General Welfare Clause did not give Congress plenary legislative
power, but did give it plenary spending power.88
This debate was largely unresolved until the mid-1930s when the
Court unequivocally adopted the Story-Hamilton position.89 In United
States v. Butler,90 the Court resolved a challenge to the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933,91 a law intended to stabilize agricultural
prices by paying subsidies to farmers to limit crop production, thus
raising prices.9 2 While Butler ultimately rejected the Act as violating
the Tenth Amendment, the opinion contained a detailed analysis of
the breadth of Congress's spending power.93 The Court directly stated
that the Hamiltonian view was correct: Congress could spend in
whatever manner it deemed beneficial to the general welfare so long
as the expenditure did not violate a separate constitutional provision.94
B. A New Twist on an Old Debate: Conditional Spending
Congress has used its spending power to not only directly spend its
funds, but also to give grants to states-provided they spend the
84 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. Il ("The said states hereby severally enter into
a firm league of friendship with each other, for the common defence, the security of their liber-
ties, and their mutual and general welfare .... ) (emphasis added); Id. at art. VII ("All charges
of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare,
and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common
treasury .. ") (emphasis added).
85 THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 259-60 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Penguin
Books 1999) (1961).
86 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 268-69.
87 Renz, supra, note 88, at 87; Natelson, supra note 86, at 8-9. See also JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) (1833).
88 Renz, supra, note 88, at 87.
89 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (expressly adopting Justice Story's position).
90 297 U.S. I (1936).
91 Agricultural Adjustment Act, May 12, 1933, c. 25, 48 Stat. 31, (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§
601 et seq.).
92 Butler, 297 U.S. at 53-54.
93 Id. at 58-67.
Id. at 68 ("It is an established principle that the attainment of a prohibited end may not
be accomplished under the pretext of the exertion of powers which are granted.").
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money according to Congress's criteria.95 This is particularly impor-
tant in determining the constitutionality of the prison provision im-
posed upon the states in RLUIPA because "[a]ll state criminal justice
systems obtain federal funding of one kind or another."96 By condi-
tioning the grant of federal funds upon compliance with Congress's
imposed criteria, Congress can use the spending power to indirectly
achieve a level of regulatory compliance that it could not directly
command under the Commerce Clause. As one commentator ex-
plained, "[i]n other words, Congress could use its spending power not
only to exercise powers that were not delegated to it, but also to exer-
cise some powers that were explicitly denied. 97 In this sense, the
spending power is the broadest power in the Congressional arsenal.98
The conditional spending power is not without limits, but its
boundaries are flexible and generous. The Butler Court delineated the
breadth of the spending power in general, but it was not until South
Dakota v. Dole99 that the Court specifically announced a test for adju-
dicating conditional spending challenges. Dole involved a challenge
to a Congressional mandate that withheld a percentage of federal
highway funds from any state that did not adopt a minimum drinking
age of twenty-one years. 1' ° South Dakota claimed that the link be-
tween a minimum drinking age and the highway funds was not close
enough to empower Congress to require the change.' 01 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that such a condition was a
constitutionally proper exercise of the spending power so long as it
meets four criteria: (1) the appropriation of funds is for the "general
welfare;"' 0 2 (2) there is no constitutional bar to the imposed condi-
tions; 103 (3) the conditions are clear and unambiguous;'°4 and (4) the
conditions are related to the federal interest that the spending seeks to
advance. 0 5 In addition to this four-part test, the Court noted-without
95 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
96 The Need for Federal Protection of Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1998) (testimony of Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, Dir. of Legal Affairs, the Aleph Institute), available
at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju57227.000/hju57227_O.htm (last visited
May 11, 2005).
97 Renz, supra note 88, at 85.
98 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 268.
9 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
1 "DId. at 205.
'0' Id. at 205-06.
102 Id. at 207.
103 Id.
104Id.
05 Id. at 208. The fourth prong of the test was the primary motivation behind Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Dole. She believed that the condition was both over-inclusive in that it
prohibited individuals younger than twenty one years of age from drinking when they were not
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example or explanation-that conditional spending could reach a
point where it was overly coercive, effectively denying the states'
ability to make a choice. 0 6 While courts have given little attention to
Spending Clause challenges, there are serious doubts that RLUIPA
could withstand serious scrutiny under Dole.
1. General Welfare Requirement
The Dole Court stated that appropriation of funds must be for the
"general welfare," but courts should "defer substantially to the judg-
ment of Congress" in reviewing this prong of the test.'07 Thus, the
Court gave Congress the latitude to issue ipse dixit pronouncements
of general welfare intentions that satisfy this condition.'0 8 Even critics
who believe that the General Welfare Clause does contain substantive
limitations on the spending power concede that "the contemporary
view is that Congress's power to provide for the 'general welfare' is a
power to spend for virtually anything that Congress itself views as
helpful. The courts have essentially treated whatever limitation the
clause might impose as essentially a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion.'1°9 But there is no reason why the Court should not apply some
form of scrutiny; even a relatively permissive one would acknowl-
edge that the general welfare requirement exists, otherwise it is mere
surplusage."10
2. No Other Constitutional Bar
Dole's proclamation that conditional spending cannot violate a
separate constitutional provision was not unique to that case; it simply
reiterated the Butler Court's holding. Presumably, this limitation
going to travel on the highway, and under-inclusive in that underage drinking driving only
accounts for a limited portion of overall drunk driving injuries. Id. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
106 Id. at 211.
107 1d. at 207. The Court has a history of deferring to Congressional determinations of
"general welfare." See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) ("The line must still be
drawn between one welfare and another, between particular and general .. . [tihe discretion,
however, is not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.").
108 For a detailed history of the use of the phrase "general welfare" in the early Republic,
see generally Natelson, supra note 86.
1019 Eastman, supra note 9, at 66. See also This has led at least one commentator to refer to
the general welfare prong of the Dole test as "nonjusticiable." David Freeman Engstrom, Draw-
ing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power,
Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2004); Natelson, supra
note 86, at 9; Renz, supra note 88, at 84-85.
110See Baker, supra note 13, at 226.
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would, for example, prevent Congress from creating spending condi-
tions requiring states to establish an official religion-not because the
action is outside the reach of the Spending Clause-but because it
would violate the First Amendment. 1 ' One observer noted the
breadth of this seemingly innocent requirement: "[tihe broad spend-
ing power and the power to attach conditions to it contain no limita-
tion on Congress' ability to abrogate individual rights guaranteed by
the states, so long as those rights are not found in the federal Consti-
tution."' 12 Thus, while states are free to grant their citizens additional
rights beyond those contained in the federal Constitution,1 3 those
rights are legitimate targets of the conditional spending power.
3. Clear and Unambiguous
The Dole requirement that spending conditions be clear and unam-
biguous is based upon the belief that, in order for a state to make a
rational decision about whether to surrender a portion of its power of
self-determination in exchange for federal funds, it must know what
burdens it accepts with the funding.114 Whatever shortcomings
RLUIPA may have regarding other parts of the Dole test, the clear
and unambiguous prong is satisfied. RLUIPA plainly states that its
conditions apply to any "program or activity that receives Federal
financial assistance."" 5 While this language is extremely broad, it
would be difficult to argue that it is not clear.' 16 The only RLUIPA
case that gave much discussion to the Spending Clause stated that:
Congress need not inform the states of their self-evident abil-
ity to decline federal funds nor include within each federal
grant a list of all accompanying conditions. It is sufficient for
the text of RLUIPA to link unambiguously its conditions to
But see Renz, supra note 88, at 85 (claiming that Congress has used the spending power
to encourage activities that are contrary to various Constitutional rights).
1121d. at 86.
13 See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, 90 HARV. L REV. 489 (1977) (suggesting that parties turn to state constitutions
for liberties beyond those guaranteed by the United States Constitution).
1
4 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("legislation en-
acted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal
funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Con-
gress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily
and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract."').
1542 U.S.C. § 2000cc-I(b)(1) (2005).
'
16In fact, these arguments have been explicitly rejected by the few courts that have re-
viewed spending challenges to RLUIPA. See supra note 84.
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the receipt of federal funds and define those conditions
clearly enough for the states to make an informed choice.'
1 7
In that case, Benning v. Georgia,' 18 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
validity of RLUIPA under the Spending Clause. A Jewish inmate of a
Georgia state prison filed a section 1983 action against the state,
claiming a violation of his rights under RLUIPA because the prison
cafeteria would not provide him with a kosher diet." 9 The state re-
sponded by challenging the constitutionality of RLUIPA.120 Georgia
complained that RLUIPA did not clearly and unambiguously require
the state to change the food it offers to its prisoners in exchange for
accepting federal prison funds; yet the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
"once Congress clearly signals its intent to attach federal conditions
to Spending Clause legislation, it need not specifically identify and
proscribe in advance every conceivable state action that would be
improper."' 2 ' The Benning court held that Georgia knew when it ac-
cepted the funds that RLUIPA required it not to create a substantial
burden upon its inmates' free exercise of religion, and such notice
met the clear and unambiguous prong of the Dole test.'
2 2
4. Relatedness
While the relatedness prong was Justice O'Connor's primary ob-
jection in her Dole dissent, few courts have recognized this prong as
having any substance. 23 Observers have noted that "[i]n most in-
stances in which the [relatedness] requirement has been a focus of
litigation, the court has done little more than assert, without analysis
or elaboration, that the challenged condition is 'reasonably related to
the federal interest in the national program.
'
"1 24
RLUIPA has some potentially fatal relatedness problems because
of the breadth of the spending condition involved. Congress is appar-
ently conditioning receipt of all federal prison money upon compli-
ance with RLUIPA, without explaining how following RLUIPA
would advance the federal objectives behind the appropriation of such
funds. For example, it is easy to imagine reasons why Congress
would choose to give grants to local governments for prison admini-
117 Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1306 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
118391 F.3d 1299 (11 th Cir. 2004).
119 1d. at 1303.
120I .
121 Id. at 1306 (citing Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 495 (11 th Cir. 1999), overruled on
other grounds sub non. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)).
1221d.
123 See Baker & Berman, supra note 9, at 466.
124 I/d.
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stration. What is more difficult to ascertain is how these motivations
are substantially related to the motivations involved in RLUIPA.
Prison overcrowding, for example, is a problem that Congress may
attempt to cure with federal funds; but is religious accommodation a
requirement for reducing the overcrowding problem?
25
Professor Lynn Baker, for one, argued that
[A]ll federal prison money is partly motivated by an interest
in promoting either rehabilitation or, at the least, the humane
treatment of inmates-interests that are also served by facili-
tating greater religious exercise by prisoners. But the Court
might reject the premise (that is, it might conclude that some
federal prison funds, the receipt of which would make state
prisons subject to the RLUIPA condition, do not promote in-
terests in rehabilitation or the like) and could conclude that
this relationship is too tenuous .... 126
Dole allowed Congress to require states to raise minimum drinking
ages because it was related to how the highways that the highway
funds would eventually create or maintain would be used. However,
at some level of abstraction, this argument must necessarily fail. It
would be difficult to justify conditioning highway funds upon what
time of day alcohol could be sold or in what containers it could be
served, even though alcohol sold at certain times of day or served in
certain containers may be more likely to contribute to drunk driving.
For the same reason, RLUIPA cannot claim to apply to prison
funds used solely to pay for additional guards, or for security mod-
ernization because these simply have nothing to do with religious
exercise. Under the current permissive application of this rule it is
difficult to imagine an area, other than those specifically prohibited
by the Constitution,127 which Congress could not reach through condi-
tional spending. There is arguably a federal interest in having strong
local law enforcement, but could Congress dictate the color of police
uniforms as a condition of law enforcement grants? Could Congress
prescribe how colleges and universities handle their landscaping, or
their parking policies, just because these universities accept federal
funds? A scholar analyzing the question of how to handle "unreason-
able conditions" wrote that "[o]ne could imagine a situation in which
every payment from the federal government to states is conditioned
12 See id. at 496 (discussing relatedness issues inherent in attaching funds to prison spend-
ing).
1
26 Id. at 497-98 (emphasis added).
127 See discussion supra Part l.B.2.
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upon acquiescence to every jot and title of every mandate contained
in every federal statute."'' 2 8 In a later case, the Supreme Court ex-
pressed similar concern by noting that while Congress had the author-
ity to add conditions to its appropriations, "[s]uch conditions must
(among other requirements) bear some relationship to the purpose of
the federal spending . . . otherwise, of course, the spending power
could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of
federal authority."'
2 9
The Benning court rejected Georgia's claim that federal grants to
prisons are not significantly related to the goals of RLUIPA.130 How-
ever, the court sidestepped the relatedness requirement by imposing a
"substantiality" standard: "the problem with [Georgia's relatedness
argument] is that the United States has a substantial interest in ensur-
ing that state prisons that receive federal funds protect the civil rights
of prisoners."' 31 No one doubts that the United States has such an
interest, but that is not the question asked by this prong of the test.
The fact that the United States has a substantial interest in protecting
the civil rights of state prisoners shows that the spending meets the
general welfare requirement, but it has nothing to do with how that
interest is related to the requirements of RLUIPA. The court in Ben-
ning treats the relatedness prong as though it is a balancing test
weighing the interests of Congress against those of the states. It sup-
ports its assertion that Congress can require compliance with
RLUIPA by stating that "the protection of the religious exercise of
prisoners and their rehabilitation are rational goals of Congress...
,,t32 But again, that is not in dispute. Of course they are rational goals,
but mere rationality-or even substantiality--does not grant Congress
the power to regulate beyond the scope of the Constitution. By hiding
behind the shibboleth of a "substantiality" test the Benning court es-
sentially holds that the Constitution imposes limits upon the spending
power, unless it involves a highly important issue-a "substantial"
one-in which case Congress is free to act as it pleases. In Dole, the
Supreme Court noted that it had never struck a federal grant on relat-
edness grounds, 133 but the application of the relatedness prong is ulti-
mately the key to determining whether the Dole test is a de jure test
with real meaning, or a de minimis one that Congress is free to disre-
gard.
128 Adler sunra note 12, at 440.
9 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
130Benning, 391 F.3d 1299, 1307.
1
3 1 d.
132 Id. at 1308.
133 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (citation omitted).
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5. Spending Cannot Amount to Coercion
A final Dole constraint, beyond the four-part conditional spending
test, is the requirement that the conditional use of federal funds not be
coercive. The Court recognized that "in some circumstances the fi-
nancial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to
pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' '1 34 Ulti-
mately, the Court determined that the measure in Dole was not coer-
cive because only five percent of the federal funds in question were
dependent upon the state's compliance with the condition. Although
Dole made no mention of what percentage would cause a coercive
effect, it is presumably more than five percent and less than 100 per-
cent. RLUIPA, however, does not specify how much of the prison
funds at stake are subject to the condition; it simply states that it ap-
plies to any "program or activity that receives Federal financial assis-
tance."' 135 Thus, "seemingly 100 percent of all federal funds received
by a covered institution would be subject to withholding."'' 36 If the
coercion requirement truly turns on the percentage of federal funds
that would remain if a state chose to reject the condition, RLUIPA
appears to be coercive in that states are truly confronted by a "take it
or leave it" situation leaving little room for actual choice. 137
III. TOWARDS A NEW SPENDING SOLUTION
While the Court as a whole has not directly expressed interest in
restraining the Spending Clause, one justice has indicated otherwise.
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in United States v. Sa-
bri138 in which he suggested that the Court's Spending Clause juris-
prudence has expanded both the Spending Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause beyond their proper boundaries. 39 In this section I
offer simple solutions for how courts could reign in the spending
power, and for how Congress could ensure that its actions pass consti-
tutional scrutiny.
J4Id. at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
135 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc- I (b)(1) (2005).
136 Baker & Berman, note 9 at 498 (emphasis added).
1
37 Cf THOMAS WARD, ENGLAND'S REFORMATION, FROM THE TIME OF KING HENRY THE
EIGHTH, TO THE END OF OATE'S PLOT A POEM IN FOUR CANTOS 896 (1731).("Where to elect
there is but one / 'Tis Hobson's choice-take that or none").
08 541 U.S. 600, 610 (2004). In keeping the spirit of this Comment's religious metaphor I
would be remiss not to point out that the statute at issue in Sabri was Title 18, § 666. Three
sixes, of course, is the notorious "number of the Beast." Revelation 13:18 (NKJV). Justice
Thomas did not suggest that the Spending Clause be "cast into the lake of fire and brimstone,"
cf. Revelation 20:10 (NKJV), but he did express disappointment with the evolution of Spending
Clause jurisprudence-albeit in terms not quite as apocalyptic.
139541 U.S. at 611 (Thomas, I., concurring).
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A. How Courts Should Hold Congress Accountable
To ensure that Congress stays within the permissible boundaries of
the Spending Clause, courts need to apply a consistent test to balance
the legitimate power of Congress against the limits of Article I au-
thority. Fortunately there is such a test; the Supreme Court outlined it
in Dole. As such, courts have a clear and manageable standard to use
to hold Congress accountable.
The problem is the Court fails to apply its own standard. In the
very opinion that the Court created the Dole test, it simultaneously
discarded much of it. It reiterated the obvious requirement that Con-
gress must clearly enunciate the conditions that it expects states to
follow, 140 and that the conditions cannot violate the Constitution.'
41
But then the Court gutted the rest of the test by holding that the gen-
eral welfare prong is up to Congress to decide, 42 and it could not
name a single case in which it had ever struck an act because of lack
of relatedness. 43 Finally, while the Court alluded to a hypothetical
scenario in which Congress may create a condition that has a coercive
effect, 44 it did not define what actions would fall into this category.
The elements of a solid test exist, but even the best test will be inef-
fective if it is never applied.
The Dole test could easily have bite if only the Court would use it.
The "general welfare" requirement could, as Professor Eastman sug-
gests, mean that Congress can only spend in ways that benefit the
general public instead of redistributing wealth from the people as a
whole to a select subset. 45 This would cut down on rent seeking and
reduce the incentives that cause Congress to engage in the pork-barrel
appropriations that routinely fill the federal budget. The requirement
that Congress clearly and unambiguously state its conditions is not an
issue in RLUIPA, 14 6 and the Court will soon resolve whether
RLUIPA violates an independent Constitutional provision.147
The heart of the Dole test is the relatedness prong, and the test is
meaningless unless relatedness is enforced. This part of the test re-
quires a nexus between the appropriated funds and the required condi-
tions. For this prong to be an actual limitation the Court needs to en-
140 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)).
141 Id. at 209.
142 Id. at 207.
143 Id. at 207-08.
144Id. at 211.
145 See Eastman, supra note 9, at 66 n.13.
146 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
147 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 308 (2004).
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sure that Congress is actually paying for the conditions it demands
rather that merely regulating matters tangential to its spending. 48
The coercion prong is also important because without it Congress
could present the appearance of a choice while knowing that the state
is not able to refuse. Coercion through spending is just as much of a
threat to state sovereignty as the other abuses the Court sought to cor-
rect in its federalism decisions.149 But this prong, and the rest of the
Dole test, is merely a hollow genuflect if it continues to be ignored.
When the founders debated what would come to be known as the
Spending Clause they considered the question of what to do if Con-
gress exceeded its powers. While debating the merits of the Constitu-
tion at the Virginia ratifying convention, one Federalist leader ad-
dressed this very issue: "[W]ho is to determine the extent of such
[General Welfare Clause] powers? I say, the same power which, in all
well-regulated communities, determines the extent of legislative pow-
ers. If they exceed these powers, the judiciary will declare it
void....
While statements from the Federalists who urged adoption of the
Constitution are illustrative of the framers' understanding, they obvi-
ously do not have the force of law. Nevertheless it is clear that courts
have the power to check Congressional spending if it exceeds consti-
tutional boundaries. 15 The issue is not whether courts have the au-
thority to constrain the use of the spending power 52 or cannot deter-
mine whether Congress has exceeded the Spending Clause.'53 Courts
have the test,' 54 they just lack the desire--or perhaps the courage-to
apply it.155
148 See discussion supra Part l.B.4.
149 Adler, supra note 13, at 440.
150JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 443 (1941) (1836) (quoting George Nicholas); see
also Natelson, supra note 86, at 55-56 (describing remedies suggested by Federalists); cf THE
FEDERALIST No. 16, at 112 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Penguin Books 1999)(1961) ("If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they would pro-
nounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the land, uncon-
stitutional, and void.").
'51 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) ("Under our Constitution, the Fed-
eral Government is one of enumerated powers. The judicial authority to determine the constitu-
tionality of laws, in cases and controversies, is based on the premise that the 'powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
constitution is written."' Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)) (cita-
tions omitted).
152 See id.
153See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08, 211 (describing the Dole test).
154 Id.
155 Baker, supra note 13, at 229-30 ("the only meaningful solution lies in judicial review
under the existing Spending Clause, yet the modem Court has aggressively resisted playing any
role in this area.").
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B. How Congress Can Save RLUIPA and Other Spending-Based
Legislation
There is a way to properly balance the ability of Congress to en-
courage state action, yet retain the states' sovereign prerogative to
govern their own affairs:
If Congress wants compliance, buy it.
While this notion seems simple, and Congress has certainly tried
it, Congress has only done so with exceedingly broad strokes. RFRA
sought to fit virtually everything under its umbrella and was struck
down for doing so. Congress's solution was to narrow the Act's
scope, resulting in RLUIPA's limitation to two areas in which Con-
gress believed it had authority. However, to get around the related-
ness and coercion problem, Congress needs to go a step further and
specifically delineate the actions to which its conditions apply. While
this may take more effort in drafting the legislation, it has a better
chance of withstanding constitutional muster.
The end result will be a "cafeteria plan" whereby states can accept
funds-and their associated conditions-in some areas while reject-
ing such funds in other areas. For example, if Congress wants to reach
the facts of the Benning case, it could earmark a portion of its prison
funds available to states to help them with the care and feeding of
inmates. Congress has an interest in making sure that the punishment
of confinement is not cruel and unusual, and could thus easily justify
this expense as being in the general welfare. But, by directly allocat-
ing funds to feeding inmates, a related condition could be that states
have to use it to provide religiously appropriate food for those whose
religions require a special diet. If a state does not wish to do so it can
choose to reject those funds, but perhaps it would still accept funds
earmarked for security, or rehabilitation, each with its own set of re-
lated conditions.
By narrowing the scope of conditions to specific areas, Congress
could create a package that is more tightly related to the spending
involved and thus more likely to withstand the Dole test. Further-
more, by allowing states to choose the specific provisions, and re-
ceive the corresponding funds and obligations, it is less likely that the
spending will have a coercive effect. The drawback to this approach,
in the view of Congress, is that some states would likely reject the
conditions that Congress most wanted to impose; that, however, is the
bittersweet nature of federalism. If Congress wants to force require-
ments upon the several states it will have to do so using one of its
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other powers. This plan forces Congress to accept that "an offer of
appropriately conditioned federal funds may be the only means to
certain regulatory ends,' 56 but it also requires that Congress stay
within the boundaries of the Constitution. The end result of this "cafe-
teria plan" is that Congress could use its spending power to encourage
desired policies, without using it as a coercive tool against the states;
an outcome much more consistent with the original meaning of the
Spending Clause.
CONCLUSION
While a "cafeteria plan" could make RLUIPA fit within the Dole
test, the current statute's conditions are not sufficiently related to the
spending involved and run the risk of being coercive. Congress may
indeed have the power to enact RLUIPA under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment 57 or one of its other powers, but if it all came
down to RLUIPA's validity under the spending power, it would fail
the Dole test-assuming the Court actually applied it.
Ironically, through an attempt to enact legislation such as RFRA
and RLUIPA, Congress may have obtained the results that it
wanted-not through its own mandate-but through a form of statu-
tory evangelism. A number of states, responding to the fall of RFRA,
have since passed their own legislation guaranteeing many of the
same rights sought by both RFRA and RLUIPA. 58 When Congress's
relationship with the states is more like that of a partner, rather than a
parent, it can produce positive results. But until Congress repents and
absolves RLUIPA's sins, it is not worthy of the Court's blessing.
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